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HARNESSING THE LIABILITY LOTTERY:
ELECTIVE FIRST-PARTY NO-FAULT
INSURANCE FINANCED BY
THIRD-PARTY TORT
CLAIMS*
JEFFREY O'CONNELL**
The classic virtue of the market system is its flexibility. Let things get
bad enough-let a need become obvious enough-and there is a corre-
sponding incentive, primarily but not exclusively financial, for entre-
preneurs to devise alternatives to current malfunctioning offerings. Of
course, the system does not always work that smoothly, but as Adam
Smith pointed out 200 years ago, the almost hydraulic force with which
brains and energy and, not the least, capital is inclined to flow to those
attempting to right the market's wrongs is a very healthy influence.'
Right now it is difficult to imagine anything functioning more inef-
ficiently than the legal liability system, especially as it applies to per-
sonal injury. Insurance overhead and legal fees require billions of
dollars, in constantly spiraling amounts, to produce a trickle of benefits
disproportionately paid to a "lucky" few, but then only after years of
delay. Why? Because determining who or what was at fault in an acci-
dent and the pecuniary value of nonpecuniary pain and suffer-
ing-both of which the common law requires in every case-are very
cumbersome criteria for payment.
The picture is the same for all kinds of accidents including those
from automobiles,2 medical treatment,' malfunctioning consumer and
* 0 Copyright 1979, Jeffrey O'Connell.
** Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law. B.A., 1951, Dartmouth College;
J.D., 1954, Harvard University. I am grateful for the help of my able research assistants, Univer-
sity of Illinois College of Law students John Forhan, Class of 1978, Janet Beck, Class of 1979, and
Joseph Switzer, Class of 1980. Portions of this article will appear in J. O'CONNELL, THE LAWSUIT
LOTTERY: INJURIES, INSURANCE & INJUSTICE (1979).
1. See generally I & 2 A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776).
2. For a description of the tort system in the context of auto accidents, see J. O'CONNELL,
THE INJURY INDUSTRY AND THE REMEDY OF NO-FAULT INSURANCE 1-93 (1971); J. O'CONNELL
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industrial products,4 and slips-and-falls.5 For example, a recent gov-
ernment study of products liability found that the average personal in-
jury claim took nineteen months to close, and larger claims took much
longer. The average payment dollar was for a claim that took sixty-
nine months to close!6 And this included out-of-court settlements as
well as cases going to trial. Out of the medical malpractice insurance
dollar, only twenty-eight cents ever reaches injured victims; the remain-
der goes to pay lawyers on both sides and other insurance costs. 7 What
can be done about it?
Sixteen states have passed no-fault automobile insurance laws re-
stricting the right to sue for pain and suffering based on the other
driver's fault, in return for automatic payment, regardless of fault, for
one's own out-of-pocket loss from one's own insurer.8 Although their
performance has been the subject of some controversy, it has shown
that Daniel Patrick Moynihan was essentially right when he said in
1975 that no-fault automobile insurance was "the one incontestably
successful reform [proposed in] the 1960's."9 Consider the situation in
Michigan: Coverage under their no-fault statute pays unlimited medi-
cal expenses plus over $58,000 of wage loss in addition to $20,000 for
those fault-based claims that are preserved. (One who suffers "substan-
tial bodily impairment" can still sue the other driver.)10 All this insur-
ance is provided at a cost no greater, and apparently less, than the costs
& R. HENDERSON, TORT LAW, NO-FAULT AND BEYOND: TEACHING MATERIALS ON COMPENSA-
TION FOR ACCIDENTS AND AILMENTS IN MODERN SOCIETY 99-221 (1975).
3. See J. O'CONNELL, ENDING INSULT TO INJURY: NO-FAULT INSURANCE FOR PRODUCTS
AND SERVICES ch. 3 (1975).
4. See O'Connell, Supplementing Workers' Compensation Benets in Return for an Assign.
ment of Third-Party Tort Claims-Without an Enabling Statute, 56 TEx. L. REV. 537, 537-41
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Supplementing]; O'Connell, Transferring Injured fictims' Tort Rights to
No-Fault Insurers: New "Sole Remedy"A1pproaches to Cure Liability Insurance Ills, 1977 U. ILL.
L.F. 749, 749-53 [hereinafter cited as Transferring].
5. See J. O'CONNELL, supr note 3, at 48.
6. INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE (ISO), 1976 PRODUCT LIABILITY CLOSED CLAIM SURVEY,
PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF SURVEY RESULTS 50 (1976).
7. See O'Connell, An11ternative to/Abandoning Tort Liability: Elective No-Fault Insurance
for Many Kinds ofInjuries, 60 MINN. L. REV. 501, 506-09 (1976).
8. For the statutes of those sixteen states and citations to the statutes of the eight other states
providing no-fault benefits but not eliminating tort suits for pain and suffering, see O'Connell,
Operation ofNo-FaultAuto Laws: A Survey ofthe Surveys, 56 NEB. L. REV. 23, 26-27 (1977).
9. Moynihan, Foreword to J. O'CONNELL, supra note 3, at xi. See also Note, No.FaultAuto-
mobile Insurance: An Evaluative Survey, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 909 (1977).
10. MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 500.3101-.3179 (Supp. 1978). Under the Michigan law,
wage loss is tied to inflation. Originally pegged at $1,000 per month (for three years), the maxi-
mum payment for lost wages is now approximately $1,600. See id § 500.3107(b) (Supp. 1978).
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of only $20,000 of conventional fault-based liability insurance, under
which relatively few seriously injured victims were adequately compen-
sated. I I Consider too the situation in New Jersey where the no-fault
statute pays unlimited medical benefits plus $5,200 of wage loss. At the
same time, due to the pressures exerted by the trial bar, the statute pre-
serves the right to sue the other driver when medical expenses exceed
the ludicrously low amount of $200.12 According to a recent New
Jersey legislative report, the average cost per car for the generous no-
fault benefits is $40.92; the average cost per car for $15,000 of fault-
based liability insurance covering personal injury-which, once again,
pays relatively few seriously injured parties-is $70.18 or almost twice
as much. 13
And yet no-fault reform is stuck. No state has enacted a new law
since 1975, and many states that have laws that provide notoriously low
benefits and that preserve far too many fault-based claims resist
amendment. 14 A federal bill has failed to pass, 15 perhaps because the
Government has been preoccupied with trying to unsteal the Panama
Canal, creating an energy policy, and easing tensions in the Middle
East, leaving little time for a paltry issue like auto insurance, especially
given the awesome lobbying power of the trial bar,' 6 which operates as
effectively in Washington' 7 as it traditionally has in the states.'"
11. INSURANCE BUREAU, MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, NO-FAULT INSURANCE
IN MICHIGAN: CONSUMER ATTITUDES AND PERFORMANCE 42, 54 (1978).
12. The tort exemption is rendered at least slightly more realistic by precluding tort actions
"if the bodily injury is confined solely to the soft tissue of the body and the medical expenses
incurred or to be incurred by such injured person... for the reasonable and necessary treatment
of such bodily injury, is less than $200.00 exclusive of hospital expenses, x-rays and other diagnos-
tic medical expenses." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-8 (1978). Thus, hospital expenses, x-rays, and
other diagnostic expenses do not count in reaching the $200 threshold when the injury is confined
to soft tissue.
13. NEw JERSEY LEGISLATURE STUDY COMMITTEE, NO-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
REFORM IN NEW JERSEY 71 (1977).
14. See O'Connell, supra note 8, at 26-27.
15. See House UnitReects Billfora No-Fault Auto Insurance Plan, Wall St. J., Aug. 2, 1978,
at 4, col. 1.
16. For a general view of the increasing power of lobbying groups to block legislation, see
TIME, Aug. 7, 1978, at 14-22.
17. Since 1975, the American Trial Lawyers Association (ATLA), a group composed largely
of plaintiffs' personal injury lawyers, has raised and spent over one million dollars, with about
two-thirds of the funds going to congressional candidates. Half of these contributions were made
m 1978 alone. According to Lynn Sutcliffe, a Washington lawyer and supporter of no-fault, the
ATLA contributions show "a clear pattern of trial lawyers' campaign spending which rewards
those who oppose no-fault and punishes those who favor it." Fred Wertheimer, Senior Vice-
President of Common Cause, the public interest lobbying group, said that, "ATLA did not run a
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One must keep in mind the enormous income that personal injury
litigation has provided for claimants' lawyers in recent years, and their
resultant investment in the status quo. Personal injury work has be-
come the most lucrative area of practice in the United States. Whereas
senior partners in Wall Street law firms normally earn $250 thousand
to $300 thousand annually, personal injury lawyers throughout the
country, in small towns as well as big cities, often earn far more."9 A
recent report on a three-partner firm in Marshall, Texas (population
29,000) indicated that a casual and by no means complete check of
their 1975 earnings showed fees of at least $1.6 million on personal
injury settlements and verdicts of $4.5 million.20
Why such riches for personal injury lawyers? Because, unique
among lawyers, they are paid not by the hour-"tied to their time
sheets," as lawyers put it-but rather with an equity interest of one-
third to one-half 2' of the recovery. And even if contingent fees were
reduced, injured parties might just end up with less competent lawyers
and yet face all the same impediments to payment that they face under
cumbersome common law liability.22
campaign fund, it ran an investment fund." News Release, Common Cause, TrialLawyers Group
Contributes Almost Quarter of a Million Dollars to 1976 Congressional Candidates (Feb. 28, 1978).
As just one of many examples, the ATLA fund contributed $5,000 to the primary opponent of
Rep. Bob Eckhardt (D. Tex.), the chief sponsor of the federal no-fault bill in the House. The
ATLA fund was orgarized in 1975 after no-fault was passed in the Senate. In 1977 the 34,000
member ATLA moved its headquarters from Boston to Washington, D.C. in order to better fight
federal no-fault legislation. News Release, Committee for Consumers No-Fault, Trial Lawyer
Opponents of No-Fault Raise and Spend $1 Million in Political Fund (Nov. 5, 1978).
18. See O'Connell, supra note 8, at 34.
19. See N.Y. Times, May 16, 1977, at 35, col. 3.
20. J. GOULDEN, THE MILLION DOLLAR LAWYERS 64-65 (1978).
21. See Standards/or No-Fault Motor VehicleAccident Benefts Act: Hearings on S. 1381
Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 209
(1977).
A... suggestion [often made] is that limits be placed on contingent fees that can be
charged by plaintiffs' lawyers. Curiously enough, nothing is concomitantly said about
curbing defense lawyers' fees. Since the problem [of tort litigation] stems from litigation
between two sides, why is an equitable solution to limit what one side can spend on
litigation while ignoring the other? As long as we keep a system-like the fault sys-
tem--that depends on litigation, how much sense does it make to limit by statute either
side's (or both sides') access to litigation?
O'Connell, supra note 7, at 514 (emphasis in original).
22. "In all lines [studied-product liability, auto, workers' compensation, and medical mal-
practice], the defense spends more on litigation than does the plaintiff .... P. MUNCH, COSTS
AND BENEFITS OF THE TORT SYSTEM IF VIEWED AS A COMPENSATION SYSTEM ix, 21-29, 42-52,
62-76, 82-90 (Rand Corp. 1977). See also CALIFORNIA CITIZENS' COMMISSION ON TORT
REFORM, RIGHTING THE LIABILITY BALANCE 159-61 (1977).
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With so many lawyers throughout the United States having such
high stakes in the personal injury system, perhaps the difficulty of
achieving reform by legislation should not surprise us. Trial lawyers
exist in every community of any size. As one insurance official says:
"They're affluent, active, and articulate. Also, in terms of relative zeal
they have something now that [no-fault reform] would take away, and
that gives them a whole different mental set than the rest of us."23
It must also be kept in mind that even if state or federal no-fault laws
do pass in the foreseeable future, they will still apply only to auto acci-
dent victims, providing no relief for other accident victims. This gets us
back to the market. If things are so rotten-and legislative change
seems blocked by the trial bar--can the market correct the situation the
way Adam Smith told us it ought to?24 It might. Consider the possibil-
ity of elective first-party no-fault insurance.
Before proceeding, some clarification of the terminology is in order.
First-party insurance is coverage under which the policyholder collects
payments for his losses from his own insurance company rather than
from the insurer of the other person who caused the accident. The lat-
ter is known as third-party insurance: the prototypical example being
tort liability insurance."
Elective first-party no-fault insurance might work like this: An in-
surer could offer no-fault coverages in increments of $10,000, up to any
amount,26 payable for economic loss consisting principally of medical
expenses (including rehabilitation) and wage loss stemming from per-
sonal injury or death. In return, the insurer would receive an absolute
assignment of the insured's tort claim (for both economic and
noneconomic loss) against third-parties causing injury or death. The
insurer would then use the recoveries on those tort claims to help pay
23. Demkovich, It's TimeforAnother Battle on No-Fault Insurance, NAT'L J., Oct. 8, 1977, at
1572-73.
24. See note I supra and accompanying text.
25. See O'Connell, Transferring, supra note 4, at 775-76. The following proposal of first-
party no-fault insurance was outlined in summary form in O'Connell, Financing First-Pary No-
Fault Insurance by Assignment of Third-Party Tort Claims, 1978 INs. L.J. 207. The proposal ad-
vanced in this article has changed in important particulars (but not in essential outline) from the
proposal for first-party insurance with transfer of third-party tort claims outlined in O'Connell,
Transferring, supra note 4, and O'Connell, Supplementing, supra note 4.
My discussions with Robert Martin of the Wichita, Kansas Bar have been very fruitful in the
development of my later ideas.
26. Concerning the fears of many insurers of unlimited coverage or even coverage with ex-
tremely high dollar limits, see O'Connell, supra note 25, at 217; O'Connell, Transferring, supra
note 4, at 786.
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no-fault benefits to all insureds. To prevent adverse selection, the par-
ties would have to transfer the tort claim prior to any injury, 1 e., at the
time the agreement for future payment of no-fault benefits is consum-
mated. Otherwise, if a victim could choose after an accident whether to
press a fault-based or a no-fault claim, those with valid fault-based
claims would press them while others would collect no-fault benefits,
leaving an insurer without fault-based claims to provide income to pay
no-fault benefits.
The no-fault insurer would agree that upon injury to a no-fault in-
sured the no-fault insurer would pay no-fault benefits periodically as
economic losses accrue.27 Furthermore, the insurer would agree to pay
the injured insured the equivalent of any amount in excess of the no-
fault benefits recovered as economic losses in the tort action against
third-parties without reduction for expenses incurred in recovering.
This device guarantees that the insured will receive whatever level of
no-fault benefits he wishes to purchase plus whatever amount of eco-
nomic loss in excess of that limit he is eligible to recover in tort.28 But
he would have assigned to the no-fault insurer any tort right that had
accrued to him as a result of the injury.
This provision distributing the tort recovery, however, could cause
conflict of interest problems between the insurer and the no-fault in-
sured unless corrective devices are employed. Consider the following
hypothetical: A buys $10,000 worth of no-fault coverage from B, an
insurance company. A is injured in an accident with C and suffers
$30,000 in economic loss. B, of course, must pay A, pursuant to the no-
fault contract, up to $10,000 in no-fault benefits as losses accrue. When
B proceeds to settle A's tort claim with C (or D, C's insurer), B may
27. The insurer could also offer optional first-party no-fault benefits for "pain and inconve-
nience" in scheduled amounts to avoid evaluation problems. For one such scheme, see R. KEE-
TON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM 420-22 (1965). Concerning
a survey of consumers' receptivity to such coverage, see J. O'CONNELL & R. SIMON, PAYMENT
FOR PAIN & SUFFERING: WHO WANTS WHAT, WHEN & WHY? 32-34, 49-50 (1972), alsopublisihed
in 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 32-34, 49-50. For a survey of insurance personnel concerning such cover-
age, see Brainard & Lord, First-Party Pain and Suffering Coverage: A New Directionfor NoFauflt?,
1978 IN s. LJ. 319. The optional first-party coverage for "pain and inconvenience" could be lim-
ited to claimants with valid tort claims as determined in the arbitration proceedings described in
text accompanying note 32 infra. See also note 28 infra.
28. To avoid having the first-party insurer pay amounts theoretically recoverable in tort
against a judgment-proof, uninsured, or under-insured third-party, the first-party insurance con-
tract could limit the amount recoverable in excess of no-fault benefits to the amount a successful
tort claimant would have been able to actually recover. For a suggested use of this device in a
different context, see Schwartz, Statutory Strict Liabili for an Insurer'r Failure to Settle: ,A Bal.
anced Plan for an Unresolved Problem, 1975 DUKE LJ. 901, 913-14.
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wish to settle the case expeditiously for, say, $15,000 rather than litigate
extensively for a potentially greater recovery. B may believe, for exam-
ple, that in the event of actual litigation, C may not be held liable or
that A may be held contributorily or comparatively negligent. Another
possibility is that B, at year's end, may have, for example, five claims
against D, and D six against B, which they settle altogether.29 Even if
B and D individually settle the case for $15,000, B might find it diffi-
cult to agree with A on the allocation of the $15,000 between economic
and noneconomic damages, especially if the lump sum had been dis-
counted for reasons of doubtful liability. Obviously, then, the way B
efficiently disposes of A's tort claim could lead to conflicts of interest or
disputes or, at the least, disappointment and misunderstanding. But
unless B has the power to dispose absolutely of A's claim without A's
intervention, some of the effectiveness of first-party no-fault insurance
is lost.
The solution to this dilemma is for B to retain the power to dispose
absolutely of A's tort claim, but nonetheless to retain an obligation to
pay A at the level of no-fault benefits purchased plus the equivalent of
whatever amount of economic loss in excess of the no-fault limit that A
is eligible for under tort liability. But the amount, if any, of B's obliga-
tion to pay A's tort recovery for economic loss will be determinable
ultimately by A's having a right to request arbitration, in a procedure
solely between A and B, on the issues of the fact and amount of C's
tort liability to A for economic loss. Thus B will agree, quite apart
from any settlement it makes with C or D, to allow A to arbitrate the
amount of C's tort liability to A for economic loss. B, therefore, gets
untrammeled control of A's tort claim, but A is assured of not only
whatever level of no-fault benefits he has purchased, but also of
whatever economic loss in excess of that limit he is eligible for under
tort liability.30
29. It is, after all, the possibility of such expeditious settlement of claims between insurers
and self-insurers that is one of the virtues of first-party no-fault insurance.
30. Arbitration of the amount due from the tortfeasor also solves the problem of conflict of
interest when an insurer insures both the injured first-party and the third-party tortfeasor. The
injured first-party is guaranteed an independent forum to determine the tortfeasor's liability,
notwithstanding the identity of the tortfeasor's insurer.
A first-party insurer may find it distasteful to assert a tort claim against one of its own insureds.
For example, .4, who is paying first-party no-fault benefits to B, is later in the position of asserting
Bis tort claim against C, whom .4 either is insuring for tort liability or for other coverage. The
problem is scarcely unique to this proposal of elective first-party no-fault insurance; indeed it
arises frequently today, without presenting insuperable problems, when an insurer is subrogated
to claims against one of its own insureds.
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Let us return to hypothetical cases: Assume A again elected $10,000
of no-fault benefits, but now he suffers $8,000 of economic loss and
$12,000 of noneconomic loss. A receives $8,000 in no-fault benefits
from B who, in turn, succeeds to A's entire $20,000 tort claim against
C.31 B will use the $12,000 recovered forA's noneconomic loss to fund
payment of the noneconomic loss of its insureds without tort claims.
Note that where A has insured himself for as much or more in no-fault
benefits as he suffers in economic loss, there is no problem in distribut-
ing the tort proceeds to A except in exceptional cases.
This brings us back to our hypothetical where A elected $10,000 of
no-fault benefits and suffered $30,000 of economic loss. Further as-
sume that A incurs $25,000 of noneconomic loss, and B pays A $10,000
in no-fault benefits as the loss accrues. B also files a claim against C
(or D, C's liability insurer). As suggested above, B may settle the
claim individually with D, or B and D may, at year's end, negotiate a
bulk settlement of all mutual claims. This gives rise to various pos-
sibilities as B deals with C or D.
First, B may not be able to extract a settlement from C (e.g., due to
doubtful liability), or B may settle with C for an amount that includes
a figure (assume $7,000) allocable to A's economic loss that is less than
A's no-fault limit ($ 10,000). In either event, B would not make an offer
to A in excess of the no-fault benefits. But A would have the right to
arbitrate with B whether he is entitled to payment for amounts due in
tort from C for his economic loss above the no-fault limits. A, how-
ever, would be obliged to pay his own lawyer if he wished to retain one
for such a proceeding.
Second, B may settle with C for an amount in excess of B's no-fault
obligation to A and then offer A the amount B thinks represents A's
share of the settlement allocable to A's economic loss above the no-
fault limits. Assume in this regard that B settles with C for $18,000 and
then offers A $8,000, representing the amount of the settlement in ex-
cess of the no-fault limits ($10,000). A can either accept the $8,000 or
demand a separate arbitration with B over the fair evaluation of A's
31. The first-party no-fault contract should probably be written as excess insurance, 'e., pay-
able only to the extent that collateral sources such as health insurance and sick leave are not
payable. To that extent, the collateral sources would be eligible to share in A's tort recovery, as
they would have had no assignment to B been made.
If A has no-fault insurance on his wage loss for less than his actual wages-e.g., insurance for
$200 a week when he actually loses $360-he should be entitled to the difference, if recoverable in
tort. See J. O'CONNELL & R. HENDERSON, supra note 2, at 318-20.
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claim for more. Such an arbitration proceeding would be very similar
to those routinely held under uninsured motorist coverage where a
first-party insurer and its insured arbitrate the value of the insured's
tort claim against a third-party, with the first-party insurer in effect as-
suming the role of the third-party's liability insurer. The main differ-
ence is that only a portion of the insured's economic loss due from the
third-party, not his entire economic and noneconomic loss, is assessable
against the first-party insurer. Note again that A (as with uninsured
motorist coverage) must pay for his own lawyer if he wishes to retain
one in this proceeding,32 and that any amounts payable in excess of the
no-fault limits, whether payable pursuant to arbitration or not, could
be payable periodically as losses accrue (as with the no-fault benefits).
Third, B can litigate against C (either pursuant to arbitration or
otherwise). Either A or B can then insist that A join the litigation, in
which event A will be bound by the findings as to his losses. A may
secure and pay for his own counsel or rely on B's counsel. In the pro-
ceeding, whether by arbitration or otherwise, A and B will request that
the trier of fact, in a special verdict, separate economic from
noneconomic damages.33 Note that because A stands to gain from a
finding of economic loss in excess of the no-fault limits and because the
finding of noneconomic loss (which accrues to B) will normally vary
positively with the finding of economic loss, there is a confluence of
interest between A and B, making it less likely and necessary that A
retain separate counsel in litigation against C.
Note also that in such a proceeding there is nothing to flag to the
trier of fact-whether judge, juror, or arbitrator-that to any abnormal
extent B is a party in interest. Thus the case will be tried exactly like a
case where A is claiming for both his economic and noneconomic loss
and B is subrogated to the extent of any first-party payment to A. But
there is no reason why, if necessary, a court could not take steps to
shield a jury from knowledge of B's interest as plaintiff, just as a jury is
normally shielded from knowledge of an insurer's interest as defendant
or as subrogee.34
32. For a device whereby the insurer and claimant could each pay one-half of the claimant's
legal fees, see R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, supra note 27, at 324, 438.
33. For a proposed statutory provision for such a separation, see id. at 324, 446; UNIFORM
PERIODIC PAYMENTS ACT § 3 (Tent. Draft 1978).
34. See R. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW § 3.10(c)(l) (1971). Note that the con-
tract can require the insured to cooperate in the prosecution of a claim, as he must under present
law when the insurer is a subrogee or when he is required to cooperate in the defense of an action
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B will retain control of the handling of the claim against C through-
out the case, including retaining the right to settle at any point, subject
once again to A's right to arbitration of the amount due from B based
on A's tort claim for his. economic loss above the no-fault limits.
Assume thatA (who, it will be recalled, has purchased $10,000 of no-
fault coverage) has a total claim against C, which is arbitrated to a
liability finding of $30,000 in economic loss and $25,000 in
noneconomic loss. The parties could structure the arrangement so that:
(1) the entire verdict is payable to B, with B then obligated to continue
to pay no-fault benefits to A periodically as losses accrue until the
$30,000 limit is reached; or (2) B pays the $20,000, representing A's
economic loss above the no-fault limits, directly to A in lump sum,
thereby extinguishing any further obligation except to continue peri-
odic payment of no-fault benefits until the $10,000 limit is reached; or
(3) B pays A in lump sum the entire amount of A's economic loss
above amounts already paid in no-fault benefits. The first arrangement
seems preferable.
Note the advantages to a no-fault insured under first-party no-fault
insurance. He is assured of automatic payment of economic loss at
whatever level he chooses in the event of accidental personal injury and
of payment of whatever tort damages he would have received for his
economic loss without the necessity of incurring attorneys' fees or other
litigation expenses for either no-fault or fault-based payment.35 His net
payment, therefore, will often be almost as great as, and sometimes
greater than, the payment he would have received at common law,
while suffering much less uncertainty and anxiety. To take our hypo-
thetical case again: If A had a valid tort claim against C and recovered
his entire loss of $55,000 ($30,000 economic loss plus $25,000
noneconomic loss), he would normally pay at least one-third to a law-
yer (or $18,333), leaving him with a net of $36,667. Under the elective
first-party no-fault plan he receives a net of $30,000 with $10,000 (the
amount he chose) payable automatically without the uncertainty and
angst of tort litigation. Assuming litigation expenses of fifty per-
against himself that is covered by insurance. See O'Connell, Transferring, supra note 4, at 777
n.98. See also text accompanying note 48 infra.
35. On the possible use of deductibles-in addition to the built-in deductible of structuring
first-party no-fault as excess insurance, see note 31 supra-as a means of controlling costs, espe-
cially due to increased claim frequency, see O'Connell, supra note 25, at 217-18; O'Connell,
Transferring, supra note 4, at 787-89.
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cent,36A would have received net payment of $27,500 from tort liability
insurance versus $30,000 under elective first-party no-fault insurance.
Admittedly, the no-fault insurer and the insurer of the third-party
who injured the no-fault insured would still have to settle the complex
questions of fault and the value of pain and suffering. But those issues
would now arise between two insurance companies, who would in all
likelihood settle the matter expeditiously by informal means and with-
out the expensive litigation that now occurs with many intercompany
claims.37 And regardless of whether litigation results, an insurance
company would not pay its lawyer a third or more of any recovery, as
individual injury victims must do. Casualty insurance companies in-
stead pay their lawyers the same way they pay their salaried execu-
tives-well, but not well enough to make them quick millionaires.38
Of course, one might argue that placing tort claims completely in the
hands of insurance companies-who are presumably less risk averse
than individual claimants-would result in an increase in personal in-
jury litigation with its attendant cost to society. As one person wrote to
me after considering my proposal:
Suppose, by illustration, that potential litigation between two insurance
companies is perceived by both parties to offer the plaintiff insurance
company a 50% chance of winning $100,000, and that counsel fees for
each side would be $5,000 independent of the outcome. If both compa-
nies were risk neutral, plaintiff company would value the suit at $45,000
(half of $100,000 less $5,000) while defendant insurance company would
value the suit at -$55,000 (half of $100,000 minus $5,000). There would
thus be a settlement range of $45,000 to $55,000. A risk averse individual
plaintiff, in contrast, would value the suit at less than $45,000; such a
plaintiff would rather be paid a fixed sum less than $45,000 than gamble
for the expected value of $45,000. This produces a greater settlement
range when an individual plaintiff faces a defendant insurance company
than when two insurance companies face each other. Unless individual
plaintiffs are more likely than insurance companies to misperceive their
chances in the tort suit, one might expect the litigation by companies
would be more likely than litigation by individuals.
36. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
37. For example, elaborate intercompany arbitration is used expeditiously to deal with colli-
sion insurers' claims against property damage liability insurers for auto damage.
38. But see note 21 supra. Although in the aggregate defense lawyers are paid more than
plaintiffs' lawyers, the main reason cited is that "[t]he defense expenditure on litigation is much
greater, relative to the plaintfi's, on less serious cases." P. MUNCH, supra note 22, at ix. See also
O'Connell, Transferring, supra note 4, at 750 n.9. When insurers negotiate with each other, such
expenditures in smaller cases might decline. See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
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The consequences of contingent fees for lawyers should also be ex-
plored: Isn't it probable that a contingent fee lawyer representing an indi-
vidual plaintiff would be even more risk averse than the flat-fee lawyer of
the insurance company?
The consequences of variation in risk aversion, perceptions of
probabilities of success and the resulting settlement ranges must be evalu-
ated to test the claim of reduced administrative costs under [elective first-
party no-fault insurance].39
There are several pertinent comments to these observations. First, as
the writer suggests, the lack of expertise on the part of many claimants
and their lawyers in appraising the value of personal injury claims may
lead to more litigation than would result if experienced parties on both
sides were negotiating over the matter.40 Second, unlike plaintiffs' law-
yers, who on the whole deal with clients who are at their mercy, insur-
ance company lawyers and claimsmen are subject to the discipline of a
commercially astute organization that will be inclined to eliminate
needless litigation. Third, even if the total amount of litigation in-
creases, that is not necessarily a bad thing. The greatest evil of the
present system is the existence of a vast pool of insurance dollars that is
paid out either not at all or in such a dilatory, haphazard manner to
needy claimants, while others, usually less needy, are overpaid. It is
not necessarily a condemnation of elective first-party no-fault insur-
ance to assert that such insurance will result in more claims and litiga-
tion if that litigation is between sophisticated commercial parties
shrewdly asserting arguably valid claims against each other (with the
concomitant benefit of internalization of costs),41 while needy accident
39. Private correspondence with the author, May 26, 1978.
40. One of the most respected federal trial judges in the country-formerly a leading trial
lawyer as well as a law school professor--commented to me recently on Chief Justice Burger's
estimate that one-third to one-half of American lawyers are not properly qualified for trial advo-
cacy. See Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized Training and Certiflcalion of
Advocates Essential to Our System of Justice?, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 227 (1973). But see N.Y.
Times, Feb. 11, 1978, at I, col. 3. This trial judge said:
The biggest cause of inept trial lawyering is the non-personal injury lawyer who reads in
the Jury Verdict Reporter Newsletter that some big-name lawyer. . . has won a $450,000
verdict for a broken leg. The kid next door then breaks his leg on a skateboard and such
a lawyer thinks it is worth $450,000, out of which he is going to net, say, $150,000 (that's
a lot of real estate closings!). But his case is not a $450,000 case-it is a $1,500 case at
best. But with stars in his eyes he refuses a reasonable settlement. In fact, professionally
and temperamentally he is totally inadequate for trial work. He hates the combat and is
completely out of his element. But, not being willing to settle, he comes to court along
with his client, and they both take an awful beating. That's where your inadequate trial
work stems from.
41. The costs of its accidents that are properly reflected in an enterprise's costs are, in the
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victims are promptly paid for their real losses. Thus first-party no-fault
insurance focuses on the needy accident victim to whom it is preemi-
nently fair. He gives up-as he does under statutory workers' compen-
sation or statutory no-fault automobile insurance-all, or the bulk of,
his fault-based claim in return for guaranteed no-fault payment.42
This plan for no-fault benefits will not be mandatory.43 Rather, it
will be elective, allowing, but not compelling, any insurer to offer it by
contract and similarly allowing any potential accident victim to refuse
it." Given the apparent public preference, evidenced by many polls,
for certainty of payment versus the gamble of a lawsuit, one can expect
widespread acceptance of no-fault.4 5 Thus an automobile insurer could
offer no-fault insurance benefits for accidents to its insureds in states
without, or with inadequate, no-fault automobile insurance laws.
economists' argot, "internalized"; costs that are not thus reflected are "externalized." The virtues
of internalization have been crisply summarized by former Professor Leonard Ross of the Colum-
bia Law School:
[Market] deterrence operates by placing the costs of accidents on the activities which
cause them; for example, by making power lawn mower manufacturers liable for all
damage caused by malfunctions of their mowers. In theory, mower prices would then
rise and sales fall; some families would be induced to shift to manual mowers, the total
amount of power mowering would be reduced, and the level of accidents would abate.
Moreover, manufacturers might become choosy about customers, raising prices to non-
institutional buyers or perhaps simply to obvious schlemiels. Finally, they would have
an incentive to redesign mowers to improve safety features. A variety of market forces
would be set in motion to lower the total loss through accidents.
Ross, Book Review, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1322, 1323 (1971).
42. Essentially the same bargain with potential accident victims is struck under first-party no-
fault insurance as under workers' compensation, auto no-fault statutes, and other plans and pro-
posals for no-fault insurance both here and abroad. See O'Connell, supra note 25, at 213-16;
O'Connell, Transferring, supra note 4, at 779-86.
43. Concerning the virtues of voluntary market solutions versus mandatory governmental
solutions, see O'Connell, supra note 25, at 221.
44. For an indication that when employees have an election, they do not choose to preserve
their tort rights as opposed to accepting no-fault coverage under workers' compensation acts, see
Horovitz & Bear, Would a Compulsory Workman's Compensation Act Without Trial by Jury Be
Constitutional in Massachusetts?, 18 B.U.L. REV. 1, 35-36 (1938).
45. J. O'CONNELL & W. WILSON, CAR INSURANCE AND CONSUMER DESIRES 4-5 (1960);
O'Connell & Simon, Paymentfor Pain A Suffering: Who Wants "at, When & Why?, 1972 U. ILL.
L.F. 1. For a comprehensive review of the public opinion surveys on no-fault versus tort liability
insurance, see O'Connell & Wilson, The Department of Transportation and Market Facts Public
Opinion Polls on No-Fault 4uto Insurance, 1971 INS. L.J. 239; O'Connell & Wilson, Public Opinion
on No-Fault Auto Insurance- 4 Survey of the Surveys, 1970 U. ILL. L.F. 307, also published in
O'Connell & Wilson, Public Opinion Polls on the Fault Systen" State Farm Versus Other Surveys,
1970 INS. LJ. 261. Although these studies apply to auto accidents, the public aversion to the tort
liability process would seem to apply to other accidents as well. See A. CONARD, J. MORGAN, R.
PRATT, C. VOLZ, & R. BOMBAUGH, AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COSTS AND PAYMENTS: STUDIES IN
THE ECONOMICS OF INJURY REPARATION 280, 287-89 (1964); J. O'CONNELL, supra note 3, at 112-
15.
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Workers' compensation insurers could offer employees-pursuant to
collective bargaining'-benefits supplementing inadequate workers'
compensation benefits for all injuries in the course of employment and
no-fault benefits to employees and their families for off-the-job acci-
dents. Health and disability insurers, either writing individual or group
policies, or casualty companies writing homeowners' coverage, could
offer no-fault coverage for all kinds of accidents. Professional trade
associations could offer similar coverage to their members.
Insureds should assign their claims for punitive damages as well as
compensatory loss. The main purpose of punitive damages, after all, is
to punish the wrongdoer and to deter such conduct by him and others.
So long as the damages fall on the tortfeasor, that purpose is served
regardless of who actually receives payment. Thus, inclusion of puni-
tive damages in the third-party tort suit by the assignee does not sub-
vert the policy behind such damages. In point of fact, the proceeds of
these damages will be better used if they help fund first-party no-fault
benefits. In addition, if the injured party retains the right to punitive
damages, the power of the assignee to settle the claim expeditiously is
hindered. On balance, then, the assignment of the punitive damages
portion of the claim, in addition to other portions, seems preferable.47
Would allowing pursuit of the claim primarily or solely in the inter-
est of an insurer deflate jury verdicts for pain and suffering and thereby
also reduce the funds available to pay no-fault claims? Several factors
militate against the likelihood of this occurring: The jury need not be
informed that the plaintiff is an insurer any more than it is now told in
personal injury cases that the defendant is an insurer. Moreover, at
least initially, such lawsuits by insurers will be relatively rare; juries,
therefore, probably will not suspect who is the real party in interest.48
To the extent also that the accident victim retains an interest in the
claim, the problem is lessened. But even assuming transfer of the entire
fault-based claim and the widespread practice of no-fault insurers
pressing such claims, lower pain and suffering verdicts, while perhaps
more likely, need not be substantial. A University of Chicago jury
46. Concerning related collective bargaining matters, see O'Connell, Bargainingfor Waivers
of Third-Party Tort Claims:.An Answer to Product Liability Woes/or Employers and Their Employ-
ees and Suppliers, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 435, 462-67. Concerning the possibility of a union binding its
members to the acceptance of no-fault benefits in return for assignment of tort claims, see
O'Connell, Supplementing, supra note 4, at 548-49.
47. See O'Connell, Supplementing, supra note 4, at 545-48 n.42.
48. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
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study found jurors conscientiously follow the law, as opposed to their
subjective prejudices, including feelings for or against insurance com-
panies."9 Finally, if and when no-fault insurers press their insureds'
fault-based claims to the point that it affects the size of jury verdicts,
insurers (who are, after all, often defendants in such suits) will benefit
from the new climate. And it certainly seems unlikely that the proceeds
from fault-based claims will be so reduced that they cause abandon-
ment of a no-fault coverage that has become so widespread.
This plan for elective no-fault insurance permits the insurance indus-
try to harness liability insurance both for its own and the public's ad-
vantage. Insurers seem almost panicked over current trends in
personal injury liability and their inability to control them through leg-
islation or otherwise. But far from requiring vast, revolutionary and
unpredictable changes dictated by often hostile or uninformed legisla-
tures, elective contracts for no-fault insurance with a corresponding
purchase of the payees' fault-based claims need not await statutory au-
thorization. Further, the insurance industry can structure these con-
tracts itself subject, of course, to input in the public interest through
regulatory approval by insurance commissioners.50
It is true that there are legal rules that at first blush might seem to
inhibit the implementation of such elective no-fault insurance, e.g.,
rules prohibiting the sale of personal injury claims and rules against
maintenance and champerty, which supposedly prohibit lawyers from
sharing in the proceeds of a suit.' But these rules were instituted to
prevent the use of unfair advantage against injured victims and "offi-
49. See Kalven, The Dignity ofthe Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REv. 1055, 1065, 1072 (1964).
50. Several insurance commissioners have indicated to me informally that they would ap-
prove first-party elective no-fault insurance contracts calling for the assignment of third-party tort
claims. As to the arguable necessity of an insurance commissioner's approval, see R. KEETON,
supra note 34, at 71-72, 543-45, 550-53. Although a legislature could ban such contracts, the
burden on any party trying to pass legislation to stifle innovation in this field would be heavy, just
as the burden of trying to pass legislation requiring no-fault insurance has been heavy. See text
accompanying note 14 supra.
51. See notes 52-53 infra.
Concerning binding members of the insured's family, other adults in the family could volunta-
rily become first-party insureds. As to binding minor members of the family, see O'Connell, supra
note 25, at 220 n.36; O'Connell, Transferring, supra note 4, at 790-91 n.136.
As to the out-of-state validity of first-party no-fault insurance contracts in return for assign-
ments of the payees' entire tort claim, one should note the willingness of courts to honor out-of-
state barriers to the tort rights of injured employees where relatively generous workers' compensa-
tion benefits supply the quid pro quo for surrender of the tort claims. See 4 A. LARSON, THE LAW
OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 88.10-.23 (1978). One should also note the willingness of
courts in third-party suits to honor out-of-state employers' subrogation rights different from sub-
rogation rights in the forum state. Id. § 88.23.
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cious intermeddling," neither of which is threatened when an insurance
company promises to pay promptly the out-of-pocket losses of accident
victims in return for the right to press their claims against third-parties
causing injury.52 Note that the law already allows the accident victim
to, in effect, sell a third of his claim to his lawyer in the form of a
contingent fee. Why not go a step further and allow the equally volun-
tary transfer of the whole claim (or the bulk of it) to a highly regulated,
financially stable entity like an insurance company, thereby removing
almost all the risk of uncompensated accident loss.53
Fears about the propriety and legality of insurers actually prosecut-
ing others' personal injury claims may, however, thwart the implemen-
tation of my proposal. In that event, the first-party no-fault insurer
could contract only for the right to waive its insureds' third-party tort
claims. Thus, a first-party no-fault insurer would gain from its policy-
holders (at their individual option) the right to waive, but not actually
prosecute, the policyholders' third-party tort claims (or those of their
survivors) in return for the prompt payment of first-party no-fault in-
surance plus a guarantee of the equivalent of whatever amount of eco-
nomic loss is payable by any third-party tortfeasor to the no-fault
insured. The first-party no-fault insurer would use that power of
waiver of the entire third-party tort claim as leverage to negotiate with
third-parties for payment to the first-party insurer up to the amount of
the first-party insurers' obligation to its payees. And any amount in
excess of its obligation to its insured received from the third-party by
the first-party insurer would be payable to the no-fault insured. If,
within a period defined in the policy, the alleged third-party tortfeasor
or its insurer has not settled with the first-party no-fault insurer, the
latter could assign the third-party tort claim back to the injured party
(subject to a right of subrogation in favor of the first-party insurer to
the extent of its payment to the injured party). At that point the injured
party will be free to assert his third-party tort claim in a normal fash-
ion, while retaining, or continuing to receive, first-party no-fault
benefits.
Under this arrangement, the first-party insurer will not be in a posi-
tion to recover amounts paid for its payees' pain and suffering to help
fund no-fault payments. But at least the first-party insurers will have
52. See also O'Connell, supra note 25, at 224-25; O'Connell, Supplementing, supra note 4, at
552; O'Connell, Transferring, supra note 4, at 807-09.
53. See O'Connell, The Interlocking Death and Rebirth of Contract and Tort, 75 MICH. L,
Rav. 659, 681-83 (1977), reprinted in abridgedform in 1977 INs. L.J. 734, 745-47.
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an effective lever to obtain reimbursement of its no-fault payments
from any apparent tortfeasor without resort to litigation. Clearly, if the
apparent tortfeasor wants to litigate the liability issue, the first-party
insurer will be inclined to send the claim back to its insured-payee. But
to avoid that exposure to much greater liability, the third-party will be
under great pressure at least to make a substantial contribution to the
no-fault payment and perhaps to cover it completely. Thus the savings
in litigation costs could be very substantial.
This device will be particularly attractive to a first-party insurer lim-
iting its insurance to accidents, such as airplane disasters, where the
likelihood of litigation and liability on the part of the defendants is
great. Thus to the extent that the number of cases where the first-party
insurer would make no-fault payments and have no third-party
tortfeasor to collect from is relatively small, this device becomes more
attractive, given the inability of the first-party insurer to recoup pay-
ments for pain and suffering to cover no-fault payments to many acci-
dent victims without viable tort claims. For airplane accidents and
other similar mishaps, however, the discrepancy between the number
of victims being paid no-fault benefits and the number with potentially
valid third-party tort claims would be relatively small. In addition,
since over ninety percent of injuries in airplane accidents result in
death, for which little if any noneconomic loss has traditionally been
recoverable,54 the inability to recover for these items will mean rela-
tively little disadvantage. Assume, for example, that a first-party in-
surer agrees to pay victims of airplane accidents under policies
automatically activated by the purchase of an airline ticket with a se-
lected credit card. The insurer would pay without regard to the culpa-
bility of the airlines or manufacturers of the aircraft and component
parts. Prior to the occurrence of any accidents, the first-party insurer
conceivably could negotiate with those potential third-party defendants
to contribute to the no-fault pool in return for surrender of the poten-
tial accident victims' tort claims.
Except for the fact that the first-party insurer gains only the right to
waive-not actually prosecute-its insureds' third-party tort claims,
this plan would work almost identically to the proposal outlined ear-
lier. Thus, in addition to the level of no-fault benefits purchased, the
no-fault insurer would guarantee payment to the victim or his survivors
of whatever amount is recoverable as economic loss in a tort action
against any third-party without reduction for the expenses of recovery.
In return, the insured would assign to the no-fault insurer the right to
54. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 127, at 907-08 (4th ed. 1971).
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waive the insured's tort rights against third-parties for both economic
and noneconomic loss and the concomitant right of the, insured (or his
survivors) to arbitrate whether there is due from any tortfeasor eco-
nomic loss in excess of the no-fault limit.
In every case where the insured had purchased enough no-fault in-
surance to cover all economic loss accruing to him or his survivors,
there would be the problem of distributing any further amounts recov-
erable in tort. But assume a hypothetical case where A's husband
elected $100,000 of no-fault benefits, and A suffered, from the death of
her husband in an aircraft accident, $200,000 of economic loss and
$50,000 of noneconomic loss. B pays A $100,000 in no-fault benefits.
B also proceeds against C (or D, C's liability insurer) armed with the
right to waive, but not actually prosecute, A's tort claim against C. If,
for example, C is an airline, B may have made arrangements with C at
the start of, or during, the insurance year to have C contribute to B's
no-fault pool in return for a waiver of all B's insureds' tort claims
against C. C would thereby get a lower liability insurance rate from D.
Indeed, it is the prospect of lower rates that enables C to finance its
contribution to B's no-fault pool. Or, as also suggested above, B may
settle the claims individually with D. Various possibilities can occur
here too as B deals with C or D. First, B may not be able to extract
any payment from C (e.g., due to doubtful liability). In that event, B
would simply assign the (presumably worthless) tort claim back to A,
relieving B of the obligation to pay any amount in excess of the no-
fault limits.
Second, B may settle with C for an amount that includes a figure
allocable to A's economic loss (assume $80,000) that is less than A's no-
fault limits ($100,000). In that event, B would not offer A any amount
in excess of the no-fault benefits. But A would have the right to arbi-
trate whether she is entitled to additional payment from B for her eco-
nomic loss above the no-fault limits due in tort from C. A, however,
would be obliged to pay for her own lawyer if she wishes to retain one
for this proceeding.
Third, B may settle with C for an amount in excess of B's no-fault
obligation to A and then offer A the amount B estimates as the share
allocable to A's economic loss above the no-fault limits. Assume that B
settles with C for $130,000 and then offers A $25,000, representing the
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amount of the settlement in excess of the no-fault limits ($100,000) due
,4 (B has allocated $5,000 to A's noneconomic loss). A can either ac-
cept the $25,000 or demand a separate arbitration with B to determine
the fair evaluation of A's claim for more.
Finally, B may wish to arbitrate with C the questions whether and in
what amount C is liable in tort to A, with any payment from C limited
to A's economic loss. This, however, is unlikely because if C is inclined
to force B to litigate, B will be inclined to assign A's claim back to A
subject to B's right of subrogation to the extent of B's no-fault pay-
ments to A. Thus, if C wants to litigate, B would have little incentive
to waive any part of A's tort claim. Nonetheless, B could retain the
right, short of assigning A's claim back to A, to litigate C's liability for
A's economic loss with the concomitant right to force A to cooperate in
the prosecution of the claim and to be bound by the finding as to C's
liability for the economic loss. Note that here too A will be prompted
to cooperate because she will stand to gain in that proceeding to the
extent there is a finding of economic loss in excess of the no-fault limits.
Here too the confluence of interest between A and B will make it less
important for A to retain and pay her own lawyer in the proceeding
against C. But to the extent that 4's noneconomic loss is greater than
the applicable no-fault limits, A will have an incentive to waive B's
obligation to pay A in excess of her no-fault limits and will simply
assert her tort claim against C on her own. She should probably be
allowed to do so. Whether B should have the right to refuse to accept
the waiver could be handled either way.
The immediately preceding discussion raises another point: When-
ever noneconomic loss is greatly in excess of economic loss (which is
more likely in cases of personal injury than in cases of death), there
may be an incentive to "bribe" B (in the economist's nonpejorative
sense) not to waive the tort claim in return for payment of economic
loss. Rather one may find it advantageous to encourage B to cede back
the tort claim, perhaps by agreeing to waive any right to receive no-
fault benefits. Whether the no-fault contract should allow this is per-
haps debatable.
In sum, courts should welcome, not strike down, contracts for elec-
tive no-fault benefits. By such devices the market can attempt to cor-
rect many of the evils and abuses of the present liability insurance
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system. A succeeding article55 will explain how such approval of first-
party no-fault contracts is consistent with a long history of judicial ef-
forts to free the law from restraints on the transfer of interests in per-
sonal injury tort claims.
55. O'Connell, Overcoming Legal Barriers to the Transfer of Third-Party Tort Claims as a
Means of Financing First-Party No-Fault Insurance, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. -.
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